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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Matthew Steven Taylor appeals from the judgment for delivery of a 
controlled substance; the state challenges on cross-appeal the order granting a 
new trial after guilty verdicts on two conspiracy counts. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
During an investigation into synthetic marijuana trafficking, an undercover 
detective purchased three containers of the controlled substance from Taylor, 
who was working in a "head shop." (Tr., vol. II, p. 1113, L. 12 - p. 1118, L. 2; p. 
1349, L. 18 - p. 1360, L. 1.) Taylor was part of a large synthetic marijuana 
distribution business. (See Tr., vol. III, p. 2152, L. 6 - p. 2299, L. 2.) 
A grand jury indicted Taylor for conspiracy to deliver or possess synthetic 
marijuana with intent to deliver, conspiracy to deliver or possess paraphernalia 
with intent to deliver, and delivery of a controlled substance. (R., pp. 13-17.) 
The matter proceeded to jury trial, where the district court instructed the jury both 
that a mistake of fact was a defense but that a mistake of law was not. (R., pp. 
307-08.) After the trial the jury found Taylor guilty on all counts. (R., pp. 338-41; 
Tr., vol. III, p. 2903, L. 9 - p. 2904, L. 19.) 
After trial Taylor moved for acquittal and for a new trial. (R., pp. 344-47, 
349-86.) The district court summed up the basis of the motions: 
[Taylor insists] he did not know the plant material he sold at the 
Red Eye Hut contained a controlled substance. He relies heavily 
on the testimony of Morgan Alley that he told Taylor everything they 
were doing was legal. Morgan Alley went so far as to provide 
Taylor a copy of a lab report purporting to show that there were no 
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controlled substances contained in the plant material being 
manufactured. The defense has characterized this in the past as a 
mistake of fact negating criminal intent. The prosecution views it as 
a mistake of law, which is not a defense to the underlying charge. 
(R., p. 420.) The court concluded there was "ample evidence that Taylor knew" 
he was selling synthetic marijuana and the paraphernalia to smoke it. (R., pp. 
421-25.) The court concluded, however, that specific intent to violate the law is 
required for a conspiracy conviction, and therefore the jury should not have been 
instructed that ignorance or mistake of law was not a defense to conspiracy, and 
Taylor should get a new trial on the conspiracy counts at which the jury would be 
instructed that ignorance or mistake of law is a defense. (R., pp. 428-32.) The 
district court thereafter entered judgment on the delivery conviction and 
sentenced Taylor to five years with two years fixed, suspended the execution of 
the sentence, and placed Taylor on probation for five years. (R., pp. 437-42.) 
Both parties filed notices of appeal. (R., pp. 446-55,457-60.) 
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ISSUES 
Taylor states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was there sufficient evidence to prove illegal delivery of a 
controlled substance given the lack of evidence that Mr. 
Taylor knew or believed that the plant material in potpourri 
contained a controlled substance? 
2. Was there sufficient evidence to prove conspiracy to 
manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver a 
controlled substance given the lack of evidence that Mr. 
Taylor knew or believed that the plant material in potpourri 
contained a controlled substance? 
3. Was there sufficient evidence to prove conspiracy to deliver 
or possess with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia, given 
the lack of evidence that Mr. Taylor knew or believed that the 
plant material involved contained a controlled substance and 
the consequent lack of proof that the items sold alongside 
the plant material were intended to be used in conjunction 
with a controlled substance? 
4. In the alternative, should the conviction on Count III be 
reversed because the jury was misdirected concerning the 
knowledge requirement for the offense of delivery of a 
controlled substance? 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Is Taylor's argument that the state had to prove that "Mr. Taylor knew or 
believed that the plant material in potpourri contained a controlled 
substance" without merit because it was enough in relation to all three 
counts that the state proved Taylor understood the substance at issue to 
be a synthetic marijuana? 
2. Has Taylor failed to show the district court erred by refusing to instruct the 
jury that mistake of law is a defense to delivery of a controlled substance? 
The state further presents the following issue on cross appeal: 
3. Should the district court's order granting a new trial be reversed because 




The State Did Not Have To Prove That Taylor Knew The Form Of Synthetic 
Marijuana He Sold Was On The Schedule Of Controlled Substances 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded "there is ample evidence that Taylor knew he 
was dealing with a synthetic cannabinoid." (R., p. 424.) Taylor does not dispute 
this, but contends that the state had the burden of proving he knew that the type 
of synthetic marijuana he was selling was illegal to possess or sell, and therefore 
the state failed to prove his guilt. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-23.) Taylor's attempt to 
dress his mistake of law defense in mistake of fact clothing should be rejected. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009) 
(citations omitted). 
C. Taylor's Claim He Did Not Know The Substance He Was In The Business 
Of Selling Was "Controlled" Does Not Present A Viable Defense 
Possession of a controlled substance is a general intent crime. State v. 
Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 925-26, 866 P.2d 181, 182-83 (1993). The requisite intent 
"is not the intent to commit the crime, but is merely the intent to knowingly 
perform the interdicted act .... " 1sL. at 926, 866 P.3d at 183 (internal quotation 
and citation omitted). Lack of knowledge that the substance possessed was 
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illegal "is irrelevant." ~ Under Idaho's controlled substance laws, "the individual 
need not know the substance possessed is a controlled substance." State v. 
Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999). Thus, for example, "if a 
person is charged with possession of cocaine, he need only know he is 
possessing cocaine. He need not know that cocaine is a controlled substance." 
~ at 241 n.1, 985 P.2d at 121 n.1. 
In this case the district court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to 
establish Taylor's knowledge that the "potpourri" he was in the business of selling 
was a synthetic marijuana. (R., pp. 421-25.) Unlike the person who makes a 
factual mistake (such as believing that cocaine was sugar or that marijuana was 
oregano), Taylor merely believed that the synthetic marijuana he was selling was 
not within the scope of the applicable statute. Taylor's arguments that he did not 
know synthetic marijuana was a controlled substance or that the particular 
chemical formula of synthetic marijuana he was in the business of selling was a 
controlled substance (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-22) are "irrelevant." Fox, 124 Idaho 
at 926, 866 P.3d at 183. The Idaho Supreme Court's conclusion in Fox is fully 
applicable here: "This is simply a case where [Taylor] possessed a substance, 
knowing full well what the substance was, but claiming now that he did not know 
it was listed in the statutes as a controlled substance. There is nothing in that 
argument which would rise to the level of a viable defense." ~ Taylor has failed 
to show that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because his 
claim the evidence did not show he knew the substance was listed in the statutes 
as a controlled substance is without legal merit. 
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II. 
It Was Not Error To Give A JUry Instruction That Mistake Of Law Is Not A 
Defense 
A. Introduction 
The trial court instructed the jury with the approved instruction that 
ignorance or mistake of law was not a defense. (R., p. 308; compare ICJI 1511.) 
Taylor claims that this was error because mistake of law was a defense. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 23-28.) Taylor's argument fails because ignorance or 
mistake of law is not a defense. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 
261 P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 
P.3d 652, 654 (2000)). 
C. The Court Correctly Instructed The JUry That Ignorance Of The Law Was 
Not A Defense 
Ignorance or mistake of law, even in good faith, is not a defense. Fox, 
124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183; State v. Dolsby, 143 Idaho 352, 355, 145 
P.3d 917, 920 (Ct. App. 2006); Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 880, 993 P.2d 
1205, 1211 (Ct. App. 2000). Taylor's argument that the state had to prove that 
he knew the substance was "controlled," and therefore he is entitled to a mistake 
of law defense (Appellant's brief, p. 28), is directly contrary to applicable law, 
Blake, 133 Idaho at 240-41, 985 P .2d at 120-21; Fox, 124 Idaho at 925-26, 866 
P.2d at 182-83, and must be rejected. 
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III. 
The District Court Erred By Concluding That A Mistake Of Law Defense Was 
Available To Taylor On The Conspiracy Counts 
A. Introduction 
At trial the district court gave the standard jury instruction on ignorance or 
mistake of law: 
When the evidence shows that a person voluntarily did that 
which the law declares to be a crime, it is no defense that the 
person did not know that the act was unlawful or that the person 
believed it to be lawful. 
(R., p.308; compare ICJI 1511.) The court granted a new trial after concluding 
that specific intent to violate the law is required for a conspiracy conviction, and 
therefore Taylor should get a new trial on the conspiracy counts. (R., pp. 428-
32.) The district court erred, and the order granting a new trial must be vacated. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Idaho law permits a new trial if the court misdirected the jury on a matter 
of law. I.C. § 19-2406(5). The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 
P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Eddins, 142 Idaho 143, 145, 128 P.3d 960, 962 (Ct. 
App. 2006). The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of 
law over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 
140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 
405,94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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C. Ignorance Of The Law Is Not A Defense To Conspiracy In Idaho 
It is a "deeply rooted" principle of American legal jurisprudence that 
"ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution." 
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991); see also State v. Fox, 124 
Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993) ("Ignorance of the law is not a 
defense." (citations omitted)); see also I.C. § 18-101 (1), (5). An exception to this 
rule exists in limited circumstances when the claimed mistake "negatives the 
existence of a mental state essential to the crime charged." 1 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Substantive Criminal Law, § 5.6(a) (2d ed. 2012) (footnote omitted). But unless a 
criminal statute contains "specific language to the contrary, ignorance of a law is 
not a defense to a charge of its violation." Morgan v. Hale, 584 P.2d 512, 517 
(Cal. 1978), quoted in Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P .2d at 183; see also United 
States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) (unless crime requires proof 
of knowledge of law, "prosecution need not show that a defendant knew the 
illegality of the conduct with which he is charged"); United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 
639,643 (10th Cir. 1995) (absent a clear statutory directive to the contrary, even 
specific intent crimes "do not, as a rule, necessitate a showing the defendant 
intentionally violated a known legal duty"). Idaho's conspiracy statutes contain 
no language, much less specific language, indicating that ignorance of the law 
would disprove guilt. 
The state charged Taylor under both the general conspiracy statute, I.C. § 
18-1701, and the conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 
8 
I.C. § 37-2732(f). (R., p. 13.) Pursuant to I.C. § 18-1701, a general criminal 
conspiracy is defined as follows: 
If two (2) or more persons combine or conspire to commit 
any crime or offense prescribed by the laws of the state of Idaho, 
and one (1) or more of such persons does any act to effect the 
object of the combination or conspiracy, each shall be punishable 
upon conviction in the same manner and to the same extent as is 
provided under the laws of the state of Idaho for the punishment of 
the crime or offenses that each combined to commit. 
The conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act similarly 
provides: 
If two (2) or more persons conspire to commit any offense 
defined in [the Uniform Controlled Substances] act, said persons 
shall be punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or both, which may 
not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, 
the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy. 
I.C. § 37-2732(f). 
Pursuant to the plain language of these statutes, a person is guilty of 
conspiracy if he or she conspires with another to commit an illegal act and at 
least one of the conspirators does some act in furtherance of the illegal 
objective.1 Consistent with this plain reading of the statutes, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has repeatedly stated that a conspiracy under Idaho law consists of 
three essential elements: "(1) the existence of an agreement to accomplish an 
illegal objective, (2) coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the 
illegal purpose and (3) the requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying 
1 There is no language in I.C. § 37-2732(f) requiring an act in furtherance of a 
conspiracy to commit an offense proscribed by the Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act. Nevertheless, because the state also charged Taylor under I.C. 
§ 18-1701, it is undisputed that an act in furtherance was an element of the 
conspiracy as charged. 
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substantive offense." State v. Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 337, 193 P.3d 878, 884 
(Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho 602,606,798 P.2d 61,65 (Ct. 
App. 1990»); accord State v. Tankovich, 2013 WL 3467056 *3 (Idaho App., July 
23, 2013) (petition for review pending); State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 690, 201 
P.3d 657, 663 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Lopez, 140 Idaho 197, 199, 90 P.3d 
1279,1281 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Martin, 113 Idaho 461,466,745 P.2d 1082, 
1087 (Ct. App. 1987). See also ICJI 1101 (intent element of conspiracy is "that 
the crime would be committed" (bracketed language omitted).) While the state 
must prove as an element of a conspiracy charge that the defendant had the 
requisite intent to commit the underlying offense, nowhere in the conspiracy 
statutes or in the case law interpreting them is there any requirement that the 
state also prove the defendant intended to violate the law or knew of the illegality 
of the agreed-upon act. In other words, knowledge of or intent to violate the law 
is simply not an element of conspiracy under Idaho law. 
Rather than examining the plain language of the charging statutes, the 
district court determined that proof of intent to violate the law was a necessary 
requisite to Taylor's conviction because conspiracy is a specific intent crime. (R., 
pp. 428-32.) Although "[ilt is generally accepted that conspiracy is a specific 
intent crime," Tankovich, 2013 WL 3467056 at *3; Rolon, 146 Idaho at 691, 201 
P.3d at 664, "specific intent" does not usually, much less necessarily, mean 
intent to violate the law, see I.C. § 18-101(5) ("knowingly" does not "require any 
knowledge of the unlawfulness of such act"); Blair, 54 F.3d at 643 (quoting 
United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[A] specific intent 
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crime 'normally does not necessitate proof that the defendant was specifically 
aware of the law penalizing his conduct.'''). As explained by the Court of Appeals 
in Rolon, the specific intent required for a conspiracy conviction is "the intent to 
agree or conspire and the intent to commit the offense which is the object of the 
conspiracy." Rolon, 146 Idaho at 691, 201 P.3d at 664 (emphasis original); 
accord Tankovich, 2013 WL 3457056 at *3. As already established, in this case 
mistake or ignorance of the law does not negate intent to commit the underlying 
offenses. See,~, Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183 (intent required for 
possession of controlled substance is only "the knowledge that one is in 
possession of the substance"). Likewise, ignorance or mistake of law does not 
negate the intent to agree or conspire to commit the underlying offenses.2 
In United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686 (1975), the Supreme Court of 
the United States rejected Feola's argument that, on a charge of conspiracy to 
assault federal officers in the performance of their duties, the prosecution was 
required to "show a degree of criminal intent ... greater than is necessary to 
convict for the substantive offense." Like Idaho's conspiracy statutes, the federal 
statute at issue in Feola provided in relevant part that a criminal conspiracy is 
committed when "two or more persons conspire ... to commit any offense against 
2 In this regard, the specific intent associated with conspiracy is similar to the 
specific intent to commit burglary (intent to commit a theft or felony) see State v. 
Brummett, 150 Idaho 339, 343, 247 P.3d 204, 209 (Ct. App. 2010), forgery 
(intent to defraud), State v. McAbee, 130 Idaho 517,519,943 P.2d 1237, 1239 
(Ct. App. 1997), or possession with intent to deliver, State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 
700, 705-06, 889 P.2d 729, 734-35 (Ct. App. 1994) (intent to deliver). 
Undersigned counsel is unaware of any authority indicating that ignorance or 
mistake of law would be defenses to these crimes merely because they require a 
finding of specific intent. 
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the United States, ... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the 
object of the conspiracy." Feola, 420 U.S. at 687 n.20 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
371)). Upon examination of that statute, the Supreme Court found "no textual 
support for the proposition that to be guilty of conspiracy a defendant in effect 
must have known that his conduct violated federal law." kL at 687. The Court 
reasoned: 
The statute makes it unlawful simply to 'conspire ... to commit any 
offense against the United States.' A natural reading of these 
words would be that since one can violate a criminal statute simply 
by engaging in the forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that 
offense is nothing more than an agreement to engage in the 
prohibited acts. 
kL (ellipses original). The Court also pointed to its prior decisions in In re Coy, 
127 U.S. 731 (1888), and United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), noting 
that in both cases the Court "declined to require a greater degree of intent for 
conspiratorial responsibility than for responsibility for the underlying substantive 
offense." Feola, 420 U.S. at 687-88. 
Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have similarly held that, absent an 
express statutory directive to the contrary, the intent required to sustain a 
conspiracy conviction is merely that required for commission of the underlying 
substantive crime. See, ~, United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 
2012) (on charge of conspiracy to commit illegal gambling, government was 
required to prove same degree of criminal intent as required for proof of 
underlying substantive offense); United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (where substantive offenses did not require proof of intent to violate 
the law, defendants could be guilty of conspiring to commit substantive offenses 
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even if they were not aware their actions were illegal); Blair, 54 F.3d at 643 
("prosecution need not prove a defendant intentionally violates a known legal 
duty in order to sustain a conviction under [general federal conspiracy statute] in 
cases where the underlying substantive offense does not impose such a 
requirement"); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding 
"no reason to believe ... from the words of the statute or from general criminal 
law doctrine, that the quantum of mens rea required for a RICO conspiracy 
should be different from or greater than that required for a substantive RICO 
offense"); People v. McLaughlin, 245 P.2d 1076 (Cal. App., 2d Dist., 1952) ("The 
guilt of those who conspire to do an act which is prohibited by law is measured 
by their intent with reference to the act to be performed and not by the amount of 
their knowledge or ignorance of whether such acts are contrary to statute."). 
Like the conspiracy statutes at issue in the above-cited cases, the statutes 
under which Taylor was charged offer "no textual support" for the district court's 
conclusion that "intent to violate the law" is a necessary element of conspiracy. 
As in Feola, the statutes at issue in this case make it unlawful simply to "conspire 
to commit any crime or offense prescribed by the laws" of this state, I.C. § 18-
1701, or to "conspire to commit any offense defined in" the Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act, I.C. § 37-2732(f). Also as in Feola, "[a] natural reading of these 
words would be that since one can violate a criminal statute simply by engaging 
in the forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that offense is nothing more 
than an agreement to engage in the prohibited act." Feola, 420 U.S. at 687. 
Accordingly, as in Feola and the other cases cited, the state need not prove an 
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intent to violate the law to sustain a conspiracy conviction, unless such intent is 
required for commission of the underlying substantive crime. Because the 
Uniform Controlled Substance Act violation that was the object of the charged 
conspiracy in this case did not require knowledge of the illegality or intent to 
violate the law, see I.C. §§ 37-2732(a), 37-2734B; Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 
P.2d 183, Taylor was guilty of conspiracy merely by having the specific intent to 
commit the proscribed acts (i.e., the delivery or possession with intent to deliver 
synthetic cannabinoids and paraphernalia, respectively), regardless of his 
knowledge or lack thereof that the acts were illegal. 
Idaho's conspiracy statutes, by their plain language, do not require as an 
element either knowledge that the object of the conspiracy is illegal or intent to 
violate the law. Nor do the crimes that were the objects of the conspiracies in 
this case require knowledge they were proscribed by law. Because neither the 
conspiracy statutes nor the substantive criminal statutes under which Taylor was 
charged require any specific intent to violate the law, Taylor's alleged ignorance 
or mistake of law was not a defense to the charged conspiracies. The trial court 
thus erred by granting Taylor a new trial to allow a jury to consider this 
nonexistent defense. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the jury's verdicts and 
the conviction for delivery of a controlled substance, to reverse the order granting 
14 
a new trial on the conspiracy counts, and to remand for sentencing proceedings 
on the jury's verdicts of guilt on the conspiracy counts. 
DATED this 27th day of Septemb1f' 2013. 
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